What Determines Firm Boundaries in Biotech? by Hansmann, Henry




 Walter W. Powell [1996] gives us a fascinating and insightful description of a
 complex industry. His central theme is that, in contrast to the old-line pharma-
 ceutical industry, which is dominated by a small number of large firms that are
 relatively self-sufficient, the biotechnology industry is populated with a large
 number of small firms that collaborate with each other extensively and inti-
 mately. This pattern presents two broad questions for organizational theorists.
 First, what determines firm boundaries? In particular, why is there so much less
 vertical and horizontal integration in the new biotechnology industry than in
 the old-line pharmaceutical industry? Second, what is the nature of the contrac-
 tual relationships between the many firms in this industry? Powell addresses
 both of these questions, but gives principal emphasis to the second. As to the
 first question - what determines firm boundaries? - Powell offers some intrigu-
 ing observations but engages in little explicit theorizing. In my comments I shall
 reverse the emphasis, focusing principally on the determinants of the size and
 scope of firms. Of course, the two questions are closely related. In particular,
 the ability to adapt institutions from academic biology as mechanisms for
 managing interfirm contracting apparently contributes to the viability of small
 firms in biotech.
 i. Incentives
 Powell observes that the central actors in the biotechnology industry are mod-
 est sized firms, like the Biogen of his figure 1 (p. 201), that focus on research
 and contract out, in one form or another, most of the rest of the activity needed
 to bring a drug to market. A major reason for this structure, evidently, is to
 create strong and focused financial rewards for the scientists responsible for
 developing drugs. The closer that the size of the firm can be kept to the size of
 the research team responsible for developing a drug, the stronger the financial
 incentives facing that team. This is particularly true if, as is the case in this
 industry, the scientists are commonly given substantial equity participation in
 the firm.
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 Presumably these incentives are especially valuable in this industry because
 the research involved in developing a new drug requires substantial effort, skill,
 and creativity that is difficult to monitor, particularly by individuals who are
 not themselves engaged in the research. This is not to say that, in general, the
 productivity of individual scientific researchers or teams of researchers is diffi-
 cult to measure. On the contrary, as Powell notes, and as we shall discuss
 further below, it apparently is not. Peer status and, more particularly, publica-
 tions offer good general measures of productivity. The importance of concen-
 trated financial incentives for a firm's scientists, then, may be not so much to
 assure that the researchers are productive, which can be judged well enough, as
 to assure that the scientists direct their creativity toward producing results of
 commercial value rather than those that are simply of social or academic value.
 The old-line pharmaceutical industry, in contrast, which (as Powell de-
 scribes) commonly employs brute force research methods involving massive
 searching, evidently has less need for creativity, and the incentives to foster it,
 and more need for large scale routine.
 2. Measurability
 It is far easier and more effective to have a market (or, more generally, a
 contractual) interface between two actors, rather than having those actors
 integrated into the same firm, when the things that those actors exchange are
 relatively easy to measure and specify in contracts. "Relatively" is an important
 word here. From Powell's description, there are many contractual interactions
 among firms in biotech that are intensely relational, involving complicated
 interchanges and continuing adjustments over time. Nevertheless, to coordi-
 nate activities, provide proper incentives, and apportion returns, separate firms
 that collaborate must be able, without undue effort, to reach some common
 accounting of each firm's contribution to, and benefit from, the collaboration.
 For this purpose, a degree of objective measurability is helpful.
 On the output side, patent rights offer a reasonably measureable product.
 The property rights to a marketable drug, it appears, can often be encompassed
 by a modest number of key patents that can be produced by a relatively small
 team of researchers. A research firm presumably need integrate only so far as
 is necessary to encompass the research necessary to establish those patent
 rights. Once secured, they can then be easily sold or licensed to another firm.
 Consequently, the research firm that develops a drug need not manufacture and
 market the drug; rather, they can license the rights, or hire the manufacturing
 and marketing expertise, or sell their entire firm to another that will undertake
 production. This is in contrast to mainframe computers, for example, where,
 despite the high degree of technical invention involved in product design, a
 marketable product is not well defined by a small number, or even a large
 number, of patents, but rather by a complex design that utilizes many patents
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 of diverse origin and is closely integrated with manufacturing and servicing
 operations. The result, as Kenneth W. Dam [1996] points out in his comments,
 is that computer manufacturers, in contrast to biotech firms, routinely cross-
 license their most important patents and rely on non-patent means to secure
 their rights to the hardware and services they sell. Important among those
 means are highly integrated processes of design, manufacturing, and servicing,
 requiring firms of substantial scale and scope, in contrast with the small biotech
 firms.
 On the input side, Powell observes that separate firms often engage in collab-
 orative research. Why collaborate rather than integrate? Presumably because,
 as just suggested, integration dulls incentives. But with collaboration there is
 the question of determining the particular contribution of each firm. From
 Powell's decription of the industry, it appears that this problem of measuring
 different firms' inputs to joint work is strongly facilitated by the fact that the
 significant contributions of the researchers involved are commonly published.
 A critical factor here, apparently, is that the research necessary to develop a
 marketable new drug is closely tied to basic scientific research. Consequently,
 the results of that research are publishable, and publications offer a measure of
 the results produced by specific individuals and teams. In using publications for
 this monitoring function, it is presumably important that the publishable unit
 of research in the relevant fields of biology is discreet and small, and that norms
 for indicating the contributions made by individuals to publications that are
 based on collective work had been well established among biological re-
 searchers in the academy prior to the advent of the commercial biotechnology
 industry.
 Biotechnology firms can therefore use publications not only as a means of
 determining the productivity of their own researchers, but also as a means by
 which two or more firms can measure, with reasonable objectivity, the respec-
 tive contributions that each firm's researchers have made to results they have
 produced jointly. Indeed, the striking willingness, and even enthusiasm, with
 which the biotech research firms encourage publication by their employees, in
 strong contrast to the secretive style of the old-line pharmaceutical companies,
 is perhaps understandable not just (as Powell suggests) as a concession that is
 required to attract good researchers, but also as a very useful means of measur-
 ing the productivity of the firm's employees and of other organizations with
 which the firm collaborates.
 In sum, a firm's workable boundaries can be determined, to some extent, by
 the feasibility of measuring published research results coming in and patent
 rights going out. Indeed, it would be interesting to know if contracting in the
 biotechnology industry often explicitly takes the form that these observations
 suggest, with two or more collaborating research firms agreeing that, if a
 patentable product emerges, they will divide up the returns from exploiting the
 patent based, in part, on the published contributions of the researchers in the
 two different firms.
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 3. One- Drug-One-Firm?
 The observations just offered might lead one to ask, not why the core biotech
 research firms are so small, but why they are not even smaller. Why not form
 a separate firm to pursue each project that has the potential for developing a
 drug, hiring individual researchers and contracting with specialized research
 laboratories to participate in the pursuit of the potential drug in question, and
 then dissolving the firm when either the drug has been successfully developed
 and patented or, alternatively, the project has run into a dead end. This is, for
 example, the way that Broadway plays are produced : a production of a given
 play is organized as a separate firm - usually a partnership - that obtains its
 own equity financing and contracts independently for production rights to the
 play, a director, a theater, actors, musicians, stage hands, and so forth. When
 the show's run stops, the firm is then dissolved (Moore [1968]). In biotech as
 on Broadway, such microfirms would have the advantage of concentrating
 financial incentives intensely while permitting great flexibility in the assemblage
 of talent needed for the task at hand.
 Perhaps there are some biotech firms that basically have this form - orga-
 nized, say, as joint ventures among individuals and labs for the purpose of
 pursuing a specific potential drug. But it appears that generally the core firms
 are a good bit larger and more durable, pursuing a group of projects both
 simultaneously and sequentially. One can speculate on several reasons for this
 larger scale.
 First, and most obviously, promising projects to develop potential drugs
 probably come and go so quickly that the transaction costs of organi-
 zing separate firms around each of them would be high. It is much simpler
 to give a group of researchers a stable home base where they can pursue
 and abandon a number of potential projects that arise over a protracted
 period.
 Second, there is the role of finance. A team of researchers that pursues a
 portfolio of projects over a number of years can more easily develop a reputa-
 tion that outside investors can rely upon when contributing capital. Moreover,
 a larger firm with a bigger portfolio of projects can bond itself more easily to
 its investors, both by effectively offering its reputation as a hostage and by
 providing actual security (or at least a further hostage) in the from of working
 laboratories and projects in the pipeline on which the investors can levy if the
 firm runs into difficulty. Without this security, there would be an incentive for
 the researchers to take the investor's money and play, rather than dissolving the
 firm, as soon as it becomes clear that the firm's original project has no likely
 payoff.
 Third, there may be reputational scale economies in attracting and keeping
 research scientists. On the other hand, as we shall discuss next, reputational
 economies can also cut the other way, and this may itself be an important factor
 in limiting the scale and scope of the core biotech firms.
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 4. Reputation Among Researchers
 A scientist has a strong incentive to work for a biotech firm in which the other
 scientists are as competent and productive as possible. There are several reasons
 for this. One is the exchange of knowledge that, as Powell observes, is such an
 important factor in this industry: a scientist learns from his coworkers, and he
 is likely to learn the most if his coworkers are of high quality. A second reason
 is that, since scientists in the biotech firms are commonly compensated in part
 by giving them an equity share in the firm, the financial returns that any given
 scientist gets from working with a particular firm will depend in important part
 on the average productivity of his fellow researchers. A third reason is that the
 quality of the firm at which a scientist works is a signal to other firms and
 researchers of his quality, and therefore affects his opportunities for collabora-
 tive work and for employment elsewhere.
 The result is an incentive for researchers to work, not just where there are
 other top scientists, but where the average quality of the other researchers is as
 high as possible. This creates incentives for a matching game that has two
 related consequences for the nature of the firms (Hansmann [1986]). First,
 firms (like university departments) will tend to stratify in terms of the quality
 of their researchers, with the researchers at a given firm all of roughly the same
 competence, and hence with the top researchers in a given field at one firm, the
 second stratum at another firm, and so forth. Second, firms are likely to be
 smaller than they otherwise would be, since having a larger number of scientists
 in a given field will generally mean having to include scientists of lower quality,
 thus lowering the average quality of the firm's researchers and making it more
 difficult for the firm to attract or retain scientists of high quality. For example,
 a biotech firm might well decide that, rather than drop the average quality of
 its scientists in order to bring a certain type of research capacity in house, it
 would be better to contract for that capacity from another firm, even if that
 means greater difficulties in coordination or in capturing the full returns to the
 firm's own research activities. Powell's report of citation rates is consistent with
 this pattern: strikingly, two biotech firms are among the five leading research
 institutions in citations per paper, indicating a very high average level of talent
 in these firms.
 5. Conclusion
 Elaborate norms and institutions for evaluating and attributing research results
 had been well developed in academic biology before the biotechnology industry
 developed. The highly collaborative forms of interfirm contracting that charac-
 terize the biotechnology industry, and the many small-scale firms that these
 forms of collaboration have permitted to prosper, appear to have been built
 with the aid of those pre-existing norms and institutions.
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 At the same time, the mechanisms available for measuring and rewarding the
 contributions of organizations and, particularly, individual researchers remain
 imperfect. As a consequence, not only is the reputation of firms based on the
 reputations of their researchers, but also vice-versa. The result is a matching
 and sorting process between organizations and individuals that itself has impli-
 cations for the size of firms.
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